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In 2020, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) found phishing to be the most common 
cybercrime, with a record number of complaints from Americans reporting losses exceeding $4.1 
billion. Various phishing prevention methods exist; however, these methods are usually 
reactionary in nature as they activate only after a phishing campaign has been launched. Priming 
people ahead of time with the knowledge of which phishing topic is more likely to occur could 
be an effective proactive phishing prevention strategy. It has been noted that the volume of 
phishing emails tended to increase around key calendar dates and during times of uncertainty. 
This thesis aimed to create a classifier to predict which phishing topics have an increased 
likelihood of occurring in reference to an external event. After distilling around 1.2 million 
phishes until only meaningful words remained, a Latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) topic model 
uncovered 90 latent phishing topics. On average, human evaluators agreed with the composition 
of a topic 74% of the time in one of the phishing topic evaluation tasks, showing an accordance 
of human judgment to the topics produced by the LDA model. Each topic was turned into a time-
series by creating a frequency count over the dataset’s two-year timespan. This time-series was 
changed into an intensity count to highlight the days of increased phishing activity. All phishing 
topics were analyzed and reviewed for influencing events. After the review, ten topics were 
identified to have external events that could have possibly influenced their respective intensities. 
After performing the intervention analysis, none of the selected topics were found to correlate 
with the identified external event. The analysis stopped here, and no predictive classifiers were 
pursued. With this dataset, temporal patterns coupled with external events were not able to 
predict the likelihood of a phishing attack.   
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1. Introduction 
Imagine an employee who works for a top company that boasts both trade secrets and a 
robust client list. Facing this particular week, this employee feels like one more misstep could 
cost them their position at the company since last week they both missed an important deadline 
and went grossly over budget for a project. As they perform their routine email check, they are 
hardly on the lookout for a phishing email. They spot an email from a C-level executive from 
their company that urges them to update the financial accounts through the link provided in the 
email. Since they already feel under the gun, they promptly respond, not aware of the lack of a 
security indicator at the top of the browser as they enter in their credentials.  
This employee and their firm have just become another victim of a phishing attack: the 
moment they entered their credentials was the moment they opened Pandora’s box. It is possible 
that they did not even realize something was astray as phishing websites have the ability to 
redirect the user to the genuine website once the phishing website has logged the credentials. 
Attackers now have access to company secrets, the client email list (that can be sold to the 
highest bidder) and the potential to drain money from the company. Not only could the company 
be swirling in financial losses and loss of proprietary information, but also brand loyalty and 
reputation can be tarnished if the media catches wind of what happened and publicizes the 
details. It takes only one person falling victim for a phishing attack to be disruptive.  
Phishing emerged by preying on the one thing that security experts originally 
overlooked—human susceptibility. A phishing attack is a socially engineered attack that seeks to 
deceive unsuspecting users, convincing them to divulge confidential information, whether it be 
in the form of user login credentials to a website, social security numbers, credit card numbers, 
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etc. (James, 2005). Although the public is more generally aware of phishing attacks, it remains a 
popular form of cybersecurity attacks. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) found that 
phishing was the most common cybercrime in 2020, with 11 times more phishing complaints in 
2020 compared to the phishing complaints in 2016 (Rosenthal, 2021).  
Commonly targeted industries or corporations are financial institutions; however, 
phishing extends to multiple industries—online gambling, online transactions, social networking 
sites, and online shopping. The impact of a phishing attack is hefty: in 2020, the FBI received a 
record number of complaints from Americans, with reported losses exceeding $4.1 billion (IC3, 
2020). The nature of a phishing attack is in a constant state of flux. Phishing first began in 1995 
with hackers posing as AOL employees to obtain paying customers’ AOL credentials. The first 
barrage of phishing attacks targeting financial institutions occurred in 2003 against E-loan, E-
gold, Wells Fargo, and Citibank (James, 2005). More recently, phishing scams resulted in high-
profile losses within the carbon market. Posing as the German Emissions Trading Authority, 
emails were sent to thousands of firms in Europe, New Zealand and Japan claiming that these 
firms needed to re-register their carbon credits accounts. This scam resulted in a theft of around 
250,000 permits from six companies worth more than $4 million (Zetter, 2010).  
Phishing is considered a subset of spam since both are a form of unsolicited emails; 
however, phishing is sent with the malicious intent to steal personal or financial information. 
Though both are often sent as bulk mailing (with phishing emails accounting for 50% of all spam 
emails (James, 2005)), phishing email techniques are much more sophisticated. A survey 
conducted by Network World found that spam filters accurately identify 95% of spam. Coupled 
with human detection, the successful delivery rate for spam drops to 1%. Coupling the 
sophistication of phishing email techniques with social engineering, phishing emails have a 
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successful delivery rate of 5-10% of emails. This indicates that social engineering enables 
phishing emails to bypass most human detection filters and the sophistication of techniques 
allows roughly 15% of phishing emails to bypass automated filter (James, 2005).  
There are various methods of preventing phishing attacks. From the technical side, 
server-side filters, heuristic approaches, and rule-based approaches exist to identify phishing 
emails and prevent them from ever reaching an end user’s inbox. Whitelists or blacklists are also 
used to block phishing emails; however, an entry is only added to the list once a phishing attack 
has successfully been sent to the end user. Since phishing targets human vulnerability, many 
information security experts stress the importance of educating users regarding phishing 
detection and reporting suspicious emails. Lastly, subscribing to a cyber-intelligence service, 
such as Cyveillance or MarkMonitor, enables a proactive monitoring of the public and hidden 
internet landscape to discover threats before any occur. Some companies join consortiums and 
warn other members when a phishing attack has occurred. Along the same vein, some companies 
will receive a warning through their security software provider, such as Symantec.  
The key to stopping phishing attacks lies in proactive detection and tracking of victim-
zero. According to the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) Phishing Activity Trends Report 
for the fourth quarter of 2016, the attack volumes in the second half of 2016 were roughly 
equivalent with the attack volumes in the second half of 2015: possibly suggesting a connection 
between phishing attacks. Are there underlying temporal trends that can be leveraged to see if a 
temporal pattern among topics used in a phishing email emerges? If a temporal pattern is present, 
then one can begin to predict the likelihood of phishing attacks occurring.   
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section two lays out the problem statement 
for this thesis and presents the research hypotheses. Section three reviews previous research on 
identifying phishing attack patterns, why humans are susceptible to phishing attacks, current 
phishing defense mechanisms, the impact of a phishing attacks, and on how topic models have 
successfully been used in spam detection and other applications to analyze a body of text. 
Section four discusses the methodology for temporal pattern analysis of phishing topics. Finally, 
sections five and six close with the results of the analyses and a discussion of the findings. 
2. Problem Statement 
Phishing is a damaging cybersecurity attack that preys on human susceptibility. 
Successful phishing attacks can wreak both financial and non-financial losses. Different methods 
exist to prevent phishing attacks, though these methods are usually reactionary in nature as most 
defense mechanisms activate once a phishing campaign has been launched; for example, a rule-
based approach is formed based on prior phishing attacks and, in the case of being an embedded 
email server filter, will identify phishing emails that are en route to a victim’s inbox.  
For a proactive approach to phishing prevention, one would have to be able to predict 
some aspect of an upcoming phishing campaign. While the attack volume has been increasing 
since 2006, attack volumes for the second half of 2016 had a similar pattern to the second half of 
the prior year. Capitalizing on these temporal patterns, a likelihood estimator of the frequency of 
phishing attacks can be created. While trends have been analyzed, these trends have only looked 
at attack volumes. By looking at the prevalence of phishing email subject lines, one can begin to 
note which topics are popular during certain times of the year and which topics tend to occur 
after a newsworthy event (such as a hurricane). Once correlations between phishing topics and 
Page 9 of 69 
 
newsworthy events are established, one can develop a prediction model that estimates when—
following a specific event—a phishing attack (with a certain subject) will occur. 
Before beginning to leverage temporal patterns for a particular topic, one must detect the 
existence of topics within phishing attacks. A Latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) model, a type of 
topic model, will discover latent topics that exist within the phishing email corpus. It is expected 
that these topics exist since it has been previously shown that LDA has been successfully applied 
to study the latent structure of a corpus of emails, leading to the first hypothesis. 
H1. Distinct phishing topics exist within a corpus of phishing emails. 
Frequency of occurrence for these topics will be used to investigate phishing topic trends 
and to define life cycles for each topic. It is hypothesized that life cycles for phishing topics exist 
in the corpus. Defining life cycles for each phishing topic would permit the identification of 
historical patterns. Furthermore, if these life cycles are defined, then it is possible to determine 
which, if any, topics behave similarly.  
H2a. Latent topics uncovered within the phishing corpus exhibit temporal patterns such that a 
life cycle can be defined for a topic. 
H2b. Latent topics can be grouped together based on similarity. 
After examining for trends, temporal relationships between influencing external events 
and phishing topics will be investigated. During this investigation, the aim is to detect a 
relationship between phishing topics and days since an event. Thus, it is hypothesized that 
current phishing topics follow historical patterns, which can then be used to predict the future 
behavior of the topics. Being able to define a life cycle for a phishing topic will aid in developing 
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a classifier that will predict if a certain phishing topic is more likely to occur within a defined 
time frame. 
H3. The behavior of a topic’s life cycle is influenced by an event occurring. Leveraging temporal 
patterns and its relationship to an influential external event, a predictive model can be developed 
to estimate the likelihood of when a phishing email topic will occur.  
Successfully developing a phishing topic prediction model will facilitate in mitigating the 
damaging effects of phishing. By establishing a proactive approach, security experts can better 
identify, educate users to potential threats, and stop attacks. A predictive model may be able to 
help curb the damage done by phishing attacks.  
 
3. Literature Review 
Understanding the current state of phishing defense mechanism, trends within phishing 
and why phishing is still successful will be discussed in this section. This section will explore 
why, despite an increasing awareness to phishing attacks, phishing attacks are still effective. 
Then the section will mention a handful of current technologies that facilitate phishing 
prevention. Additionally, the section will dive into topic modelling and how topic modelling has 
aided in phishing and spam detection and other use-case scenarios that show the effectiveness of 
topic models when analyzing a corpus of documents.  
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3.1 Phishing Attack Patterns 
A few researchers have investigated current phishing attack patterns. Riedle (2016) 
utilized data from APWG, an international group focused on raising awareness of and preventing 
cybercrime, and PhishTank, an anti-phishing site, to review historic phishing attacks and identify 
any underlying attack patterns. Both of those data sources depend upon user submission, who 
may reside globally. The study noted that there is an increase in percentage of phishing attacks 
during popular events such as the Superbowl, holidays and the Soccer World Cup. Examining 
phishing attacks over the past 10 years has revealed that November to January and March to May 
are popular months for phishing attacks, possibly due to those time frames coinciding with the 
holiday season and the US tax season, respectively. Additionally, the study found spikes in 
phishing attacks around summer and fall of 2012. This spike was theorized to occur due to the 
Summer Olympics and/or US presidential elections.  
Multiple articles warn the public of the tendency of phishing emails to occur following 
times of general uncertainty and key calendar moments. In 2020 when tax filing deadline was 
extended to May and then again to July, GreatHorn, an email security solutions company, 
observed a 78% increase in the quantity of phishing email campaigns after each deadline 
extension announcement. GreatHorn also noted that phishing email campaigns increased during 
the week of the standard tax deadline; in 2020, phishing emails increased 167% week-over-week 
during the week of the standard tax deadline (GreatHorn, 2021). A period of uncertainty that 
scammers took advantage of was the emergence of the COVID-19 virus. Spikes in COVID-19 
phishing attacks started appearing in March 2020 when the virus was declared a pandemic and 
reached a peak in the third and fourth weeks of April 2020 (Rosenthal, 2021).  
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In addition to summarizing recent approaches to phishing detection, Tewari, Jain and 
Gupta (2016) provide insights into phishing trends. Rather than phishing attacks targeting 
advertisement websites and blogs, the attention has shifted to social media sites. Phishers are 
now adopting more advanced tricks such as sending promotional and monetary emails to 
unsuspecting users. Lastly, this article credits financial benefits, identity concealing, and fame 
and notoriety as motivators for phishers to launch phishing attacks.  
3.2 Human Susceptibility to Phishing 
Since phishing is a cybersecurity attack that exploits human vulnerability, many studies 
have explored what exactly it is that allows phishing attacks to bypass human detection. 
Vishwanath et al. (2011) developed an integrated, information processing model of humans’ 
susceptibility to phishing that predicted roughly 50% of individuals’ likelihood to respond to 
phishing emails. Research found that habitual media use was a major contributor to phishing 
susceptibility, which is possibly explained by an increase in inattentiveness and automatic 
responses to patterned stimuli. Level of involvement, email load, and urgency cues in emails 
were found to be key predictors of phishing susceptibility. Overall, the study identified two 
reasons why people get phished. Firstly, people do not adequately process the information 
present in an email and will often rely on simple cues, like level of urgency, rather than check for 
grammar and spelling or identifying the sender of the email. Secondly, automatic responses are 
often trigged when looking at genuine-looking emails in the presence of high email load in 
individuals who are accustomed to using email. The authors suggest devoting separate time each 
day to reading emails and a separate time to answering emails to decrease phishing 
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susceptibility. Another way to increase recognition of phishing emails is to use multiple email 
addresses for specific purposes.  
Canfield et al. (2019) considered the impact of metacognition during phishing detection 
and studies whether metacognition is different when detecting a legitimate email versus a 
phishing email. When subjects were making determinations as to whether an email was phishing 
or legitimate, they were also asked to rate their confidence level in their judgement. Results 
showed that subjects were more successful at selecting phishes when they were 100% confident 
in their decision, suggesting they learned and were applying phishing detection heuristics in 
those cases. Those participants who were already averse to the negative consequences of falling 
victim to a phish were better calibrated to detect phishing emails but had a reduced accuracy for 
legitimate emails, showing a bias towards classifying emails as phishing.  
Alsharnouby, Alaca and Chiasson (2015) conducted a study to see whether modern web 
browsers’ security indicators were effective in aiding users to identify phishing websites. The 
study found that users pay very little attention to the security indicators (spending only 6% of 
their time looking at them) and though confident in their discrimination decisions, participants 
successfully identified phishing websites only 53% of the time, on average. Additionally, users’ 
technical proficiency did not correlate with improved phishing website detection scores.  
Parsons et al. (2015) conducted a study to test how the subject-expectancy effect, a 
cognitive bias that occurs when the research subject expects an outcome to occur and will 
unconsciously create or report the expected outcome, impacts phishing email detection. To test 
the subject-expectancy effect, participants were divided into two groups – the Control group and 
the Alerted group. All participants were informed that the study was to assess how people 
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manage emails. The Alerted group was additionally primed to identify phishing emails. The 
study found that informing subjects that they were participating in a phishing identification study 
led to those users employing diligent decision-making practices. The alerted group both took 
longer to complete the tasks and made better discrimination decisions, though not statistically 
significant, in comparison to the other group. The study additionally found that emails from 
certain sources, such as government institutions or banks, were more likely to be trusted and 
treated as important by the subjects, even if the emails were not legitimate. An implication for an 
organization is that its employees who are under either productivity or time constraints may 
make poorer security decisions. Unfortunately, this study provides further evidence that humans 
are poor at identifying phishing emails (between both groups, approximately 42% of all emails 
were incorrectly classified).  
Goel, Williams and Dincelli (2017) examined how the contextualization of emails 
impacts the targets’ susceptibility to deception. Results revealed that successful phishing emails 
fed directly into their targets’ psychological weaknesses (fear of losing something valuable or 
anticipation of gaining something desirable). Emails that targeted issues and concerns relevant to 
the targeted group were the most successful. Framing the email in a personal context increases 
susceptibility to phishing. Participants were less susceptible to a phishing attack when the email 
was geared towards social outcomes (e.g., altruism) than for material outcomes.  
Wright et al. (2014) investigated human vulnerability to phishing through the lens of 
persuasion and motivation theory. The study found that various influence techniques produce 
differing response rates, with four influence techniques exerting a significant effect. Out of 
liking, reciprocity, social proof, and scarcity as influential influence techniques, liking, which 
takes advantage of the fact that people say yes to people they like and know, proved to be the 
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most impactful. Participants were less vulnerable to phishing attacks that relied on a fictitious 
past shared experience.  
3.3 Phishing Defense Mechanisms  
Since phishing attacks are damaging, a variety of research has developed technical tools 
for phishing prevention. APWG divides phishing defense mechanisms into three groups: 
identification methods, prevention methods, and modification methods. Moghimi and Virani 
(2016) expands the groups to include four different approaches used to identify and prevent 
phishing attacks: blacklist / whitelist, URL evaluation, visual assessment / content evaluation and 
hybrid approaches. Ramanathan and Wechsler (2012) extend the groupings to six: network level 
protection (block IP addresses or a set of domains from entering the network), authentication 
(two levels—user level and domain level), server-side filters / classifiers, client-side tools, 
prevention against duplication (making legitimate websites harder to reproduce) and user 
education. Mohammad et al. (2014) introduce another category - legal solutions (i.e., US 2005 
Anti-Phishing Act) - as a way to combat phishing attacks.  
3.3.1 Email Phishing Prevention 
Ramanathan and Wechsler (2012) developed a multi-layer server-side filter 
phishGILLNET that “tries to catch phishing attacks by the tone, wordings, and other linguistic 
variation in the [email] content.” All of phishGILLNET’s three layers employ probabilistic latent 
semantic analysis (PLSA) to build a topic model for phishing detection. The first layer, 
phishGILLNET1, categorizes unseen data using Fisher similarity. The second layer, 
phishGILLNET2, improves upon phishGILLNET1’s performance by using the probability 
distributions of PLSA topics as features for an AdaBoost classifier. The final layer, 
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phishGILLNET3, refines phishing classification even more by applying co-training to build a 
classifier from labelled and unlabeled phishing examples. Leveraging co-training, the classifier is 
made more robust using only a small percentage (10%) of data. In order to handle misspelled 
words and conjoined words, phishGILLNET calculates the Levenshtein distance for each word 
and uses dictionary lookups.  
Stembert et al. (2016) redesigned the user interface for an email client to integrate 
reporting, blocking, and warning, and embedded educational elements so that users are more 
aware and, thus, resist falling prey to email (spear) phishing attacks. This was achieved by 
adding a reporting button, blocking, and warning of suspicious email, and providing educative 
tips when the user engages with a suspicious email. The proposed user interface offers three 
different levels of phishing detection assistance. The first level added nothing. The second level 
warned the user and blocked functionalities of the email client when the filters identified an 
opened email as suspicious. The third level added embedded training on how to distinguish a 
genuine email from a phishing email. The study found that most participants who interacted with 
the first level became a victim to the phishing attack. In contrast, most of the participants who 
interacted with the second or third stage evaded the attack. Additionally, the study found that the 
red header warning the participant of a suspicious email was often overlooked since the 
participant focused on the content of the email. 
3.3.2 Website Phishing Prevention 
Moghimi and Varjani (2016) created a browser extension PhishDetect to detect phishing 
attacks in internet banking. PhishDetect can detect zero-day phishing attacks. The rules 
embedded into PhishDetect are based on two novel features sets. The first set uses approximate 
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string-matching algorithms to evaluate the relationship between the webpage’s content and its 
URL. The second set of features identify the access protocol of the page’s resource elements. 
These extracted features were then employed in a support vector machine to classify webpages 
as phishing or non-phishing.  
Huang, Ma, and Chen (2011) proposed leveraging a secondary channel, such as an instant 
messaging (IM) service, to deliver one-time passwords to a website during the user 
authentication process. A potential drawback would be the IM accounts turning into phishing 
targets; however, this pitfall can be mitigated by using existing anti-phishing techniques. The 
purpose here is to eliminate the use of a preset password for every website and instead use a 
secondary channel to deliver a secret password (assuming the primary channel, such as the 
HTTP protocol, is secure).  
Yue and Wang (2010) developed BogusBiter, a client-side anti-phishing tool that acts as 
an automated fraud prevention tool by sending a massive amount of bogus credentials to 
phishing websites. Having to sift through the credentials makes it more difficult for phishers to 
discern who the real victims are. Furthermore, the credential verification process triggered by the 
phisher will enable the legitimate site to identify the stolen credentials in a timely manner. For 
users who install BogusBiter, users’ legitimate credentials will be hidden among the bogus 
credentials; the power of this masking ability escalates with the number of users who have 
installed BogusBiter.  
Marchal et al. (2014) designed PhishStorm, an automated phishing detection system that 
analyzes intra-URL relatedness and URL popularity to detect phishing websites. Here the 
detection is based on registered domains that are not related to the target brand. Using Storm, a 
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distributed real-time computation technique, to infer intra-URL relatedness and the Bloom filter 
to reduce calculation time, a “phishingness” score is computed for every URL via a random 
forest classifier. PhishStorm achieved a correct classification rate of 94.91% with a false positive 
rate of 1.44%.  
3.4 Impact of Phishing Attacks  
One way to reduce the impact of phishing would be through removing phishing websites 
as they appear. Moore and Clayton (2007) investigated the effect of phishing website removal 
and reports on trends in regard to both establishing and removing phishing websites. The 
distribution of a phishing website lifetime was found to be a lognormal distribution with a 
median of 20 hours. Within the first day of a phishing website being established, 18 users 
divulge their personal information: after the first day, eight or more users fall victim per day. 
Based on conservative extrapolations and lifetime and visitor numbers, banks’ losses directly 
attributable to phishing are estimated to be around $160 million each year. The study found that 
phishing sites launched before the weekend do not tend to last longer than phishing sites 
launched during the week. Additionally, some internet service providers are faster at removing 
phishing sites and, in general, once a host is informed to the existence of phishing sites, these 
sites were removed much more promptly. The authors conclude that while phishing website 
removal is effective, it does not happen quickly enough to act as the only method.  
Bose, Chung, and Leung (2014) found that the “release of each phishing alert leads to a 
statistically significant loss of market capitalization that is at least US $411 million for a firm”. 
Since phishing is a global phenomenon, the authors sought to analyze the impact of a phishing 
alert on the market value of global firms by implementing a modified Farma-French three factor 
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model that incorporates a global understanding of the firm’s assets. Results showed that the 
negative impact is only weakly significant for US firms but strongly statistically significant for 
global firms.  
3.5 Topic Models  
A way to gain more information about phishing attacks would be to apply a topic model 
to known phishing emails to understand topics associated with them. Topic models are 
probabilistic generative models that allow users to uncover the latent space in a corpus (Lin and 
Chen, 2012). When using topic models for information retrieval, researchers are interested in 
knowing how likely a document has produced a given query as a random sample from that 
document. The likelihood measure is typically computed through two different matching 
strategies—literal term matching and concept matching. The unigram language model (ULM) 
exemplifies literal term matching, which bases relevance solely on the frequency of words 
appearing in the document. In ULM, each document is represented as a mixture distribution over 
single words, or unigrams. A drawback to literal term matching is the lack of word usage 
diversity. These strategies tend to overfit the training data and generalize poorly to documents 
unseen by the model since these new documents likely use a different set of words. With concept 
matching, the relevance is based both on the frequency of words occurring in a latent topic and 
on the likelihood that the document generates those topics. Within concept matching approaches, 
there are two classes of topic models—word topic models and document topic models. Word 
topic models study the relationships between words through the latent topic space, whereas 
document topic models study the relationship between words and documents through the latent 
topic space (Lin and Chen, 2012).  
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Popular topic modelling techniques are probabilistic latent semantic analysis (PLSA), 
also known as probabilistic latent semantic indexing (PLSI), and latent Dirichlet allocation 
(LDA). Each model reduces a document into a distribution of words and will then attribute topics 
to a distribution over words. Unlike the mixture of unigrams model, both PLSA and LDA allow 
a document to contain more than one latent topic. Topic models have their origins in latent 
semantic indexing (LSI); though it cannot be considered an authentic topic model because it is 
not a probabilistic model. PLSA is based on LSI (Liu, Tang, Dong and Yao, 2016). LDA, a 
three-level hierarchical Bayesian model, is seen as an improvement over PLSA. PLSA will allow 
a document to contain multiple topics; however, the distribution of topics is only learned for 
those documents on which it was trained. Additionally, the number of parameters used in PLSA 
grows linearly with the number of training documents, which suggests that the model is prone to 
overfitting. LDA overcomes these problems by defining a k-parameter hidden random variable 
as the topic mixture weights. This enables LDA to be a well-defined generative model that easily 
generalizes to new documents (Blei, Ng and Jordan, 2003). Mcfarland et al. (2013) presents 
other versions of LDA and provides a helpful guide to using LDA. Since it is an unsupervised 
topic modelling method, the main challenge is to determine the correct number of latent topics 
characterizing a corpus. The authors propose four methods to determine the number of latent 
topics present – a topic’s relevance, a topic’s entropy, a topic’s perplexity and asking a subject 
matter expert to assess the quality of the topics. Three different variations of the unsupervised 
LDA model are discussed by the authors. Firstly, the supervised LDA allows human-generated 
topics to affect the learned topics. Secondly, Labeled LDA (L-LDA) assigns each word in the 
document to a label rather than a latent semantic space. Lastly, Partially LDA (P-LDA) is similar 
to L-LDA but allows more than one latent topic per label. 
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LDA serves as the springboard to many of the topic models seen today. Blei and Lafferty 
(2009) discuss two other topic models which are extensions to LDA. LDA assumes that topics 
are independent: correlated topic model (CTM) allows for pairwise correlations among topics to 
exist. LDA assumes that documents are exchangeable; thus, the order of documents within a 
corpus does not impact their probability. The dynamic topic model captures the topics to change 
over time in a sequentially ordered corpus of documents. Liu, Tang, Yao, and Zhou (2016) 
present roughly 16 major extensions of LDA. These models consist of supervised topic models; 
models that extend topic attributes to allow topics to correlate with one another; models that 
extend document attributes, such as using author and links between documents; and a model that 
allows for the generation of words by a topic based on the previously generated word. 
3.5.1 Topic Models Used in Phishing and Spam Detection 
In the more general field of natural language processing (NLP), researchers have 
investigated applying NLP techniques, such as named entity recognition, part-of-speech tagging, 
and lexical analysis, to notice the subtleties of language used in phishing e-mails as a way to 
build a more accurate classifier. Relying on the trend that phishing emails request users to 
perform an action to divulge personal information, Verma, Shashidar, Hossain (2012) created 
PhishNet-NLP to infer whether the intent of the email is actionable or informational. PhishNet-
NLP produces a classifier with a detection rate of at least 97% with very low false positives. 
With a precision of 0.996, Aggarwal, Kumar and Sudarsan (2014) used NLP techniques to detect 
four characteristics indicative of phishing attacks and later combined these characteristics into a 
single score that determined if the email was classified as phishing or legitimate. The four 
characteristics were absence of recipient’s name, mention of money, inclusion of a reply 
inducing sentence and a sense of urgency.  
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Only one other article has been found that has used LDA in the context of phishing 
detection. Ramanathan and Wechsler (2013) presented a multi-stage approach to detect phishing 
attacks and discover the impersonated entity. Stage one uses Conditional Random Field (CRF), a 
method of labelling proper nouns in a body of text, and LDA to discover named entities and 
hidden topics. Using the named entities and hidden topics as features, the second stage classifies 
the emails as phishing using AdaBoost. Applicable only to those messages classified as phishing, 
the final stage identifies the impersonated entity using CRF.  
More popular in spam detection than in phishing, research has examined how LDA can 
be used to improve spam detection. Song et al. (2017) improved the accuracy of social spam 
detection on social media sites by employing labelled-LDA and incremental learning. Applying 
labelled-LDA to user-generated comments allowed for the creation of topic-based features. 
Topics were labelled by applying the most discriminative words, which were identified using a 
chi-squared test. Incremental learning allows the classifier to learn new training instances 
without having to revisit the entire training set. Many various incremental learning algorithms, 
including support vector machine (SVM), classical perception, relaxed online maximum margin 
algorithm (ROMMA), and logistic regression, were tested; in most cases, SVM outperformed the 
others. It was found that topic-based features improve the overall accuracy and precision but hurt 
the recall of spam detection.  
Bíró, Siklósi, Szabó, and Benczúr (2008) developed the linked LDA technique to account 
for linkage between documents for web spam classification. Linked LDA models the “effect of a 
hyperlink between two documents on the topic and term distributions.” Considering linkage is 
important because topics in the linked document can directly influence words in the linking 
document. Linked LDA allows each document in the corpus to be influenced by and influence 
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another document. This method outperformed LDA and other baseline classifiers by about 3-8% 
in area under the curve measurements.  
3.5.2 Use of LDA in Email Applications / Other Applications 
There are numerous applications for LDA outside of phishing and spam detection. 
Sharaff and Nagwani (2016) used LDA and nonnegative matrix factorization (NMF) to develop 
an email thread identification algorithm. The nested textual clustering algorithm happens in two 
stages. In the first stage, LDA and NMF are used to find email clusters within the email 
messages. The second stage clusters to find the email threads using threading features among the 
email clusters found in the first stage. Both algorithms were compared to the standard k-means 
clustering algorithm. Both LDA and NMF performed better than k-means, with NMF performing 
the best. Before any algorithm was applied to the email messages, the messages were 
preprocessed through stopping and stemming. 
Tsolmon and Lee (2014) used LDA to create an event extraction model that combines 
user reliability and timeline analysis. To accurately capture reliable low-frequency events as well 
as high-frequency events, the model depended upon extracting topics from tweets of active users, 
who post information every time an event occurs, and socially well-known users, whose posts 
indicate a significant social event has occurred. With a 72% accuracy, the model shows that 
timeline and user reliability played an effective role on event extraction. Results suggest that 
certain terms may be used more frequently on the day the event occurred compared to other 
days.  
Dimaggio, Ng and Blei (2013) used LDA to analyze how five American newspapers with 
articles published between 1986 and 1997 framed government assistance to artists and arts 
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organizations. Here topic modelling aided researchers in comprehending the cultural trends, 
moods, and depictions during a time frame in which government assistance for the arts went 
from being the norm to being controversial. Another research goal was to understand how the 
tone on the matter differed between various newspapers. The study found that negative coverage 
of the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) suddenly emerged with the election of George H. 
W. Bush and that the tone of press coverage of arts funding shifted from being celebratory in 
1989 to being focused on controversy throughout the 1990s. Furthermore, the study found that 
newspapers varied in their press coverage: the Wall Street Journal’s coverage focused more on 
controversy while the Seattle Times emphasized more positive stories about government grants 
in support of the local art scene. Overall, the authors found that topic modelling is a beneficial 
tool that is suited to understanding and exploring large archives of texts. Pairing such an analysis 
with validity tests and subject-area experts can aid in answering more focused questions when 
conducting a cultural analysis.  
3.6 Summary 
 Many of the aforementioned phishing defense mechanisms, such as phishGILLNET, are 
classification algorithms designed to weed out phishing attacks from genuine emails. Some 
researchers approached phishing defense either by complicating the actions of the attackers—
BogusBiter and establishing a one-time password—or by prompting users in the presence of 
suspicious emails through a redesigned email client user interface. Although the technology 
exists to prevent the majority of phishes from reaching the end user, phishing attacks are still 
successful due to human susceptibility. The strength of phishing lies in its use of social 
engineering techniques, such as urgency cues and framing the email context to be geared for 
Page 25 of 69 
 
material gain, which play directly into human vulnerability. Even when humans are prompted to 
discern the legitimacy of emails, humans perform poorly at correct identification of phishes. 
Furthermore, these phishing defense techniques are not used frequently enough to be fully 
effective; for example, BogusBiter will only protect those users who have it installed. 
Examining topic trends of phishing emails provides another venue to enrich existing 
knowledge on phishing. As previously mentioned, phishes seem to follow a temporal pattern. 
While attack volumes have been increasing over the past 10 years, there are certain times within 
a year that attack volumes peak. These peaks could possibly correlate to seasonal events. Also, it 
was noted that attack volumes in the second half of 2016 were similar to attack volumes seen in 
2015.  
Topic modelling extracts topics from a corpus. It has already been successfully used in a 
variety of email applications from improving email thread identification to enhancing phishing 
classifiers. Various types of topic models exist and many of the more recent developments are 
extensions to LDA. Coupling topic modelling with temporal pattern analysis has the potential to 
reveal patterns in phishing topics. Building these patterns into a predictive model would create 
the possibility of generating a proactive warning to users. 
Within their article, Moore, and Clayton (2011) note that “security economics has 
identified the lack of reliable information on threats as a key barrier to optimal security 
investment”. Furthermore, it calls for a “better measurement of the frequency and impact of 
incidents.” Work done in this thesis aims to address this concern by developing a predictive 
model of how likely certain phishing email topics will occur in the wake of influential events.  
 




Figure 1: Flowchart of Methodology. The boxes highlight the portion of the methodology whose results directly 
provided evidence to reject or fail to reject the respective hypothesis.  
4.1 Description of Dataset 
 The dataset used for this analysis comes from APWG’s Report Phishing database. 
APWG allows users to report any suspicious or malicious emails by forwarding those suspected 
phishing emails directly to APWG (APWG, 2021). The database tracks details such as the 
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in March 2018, based on APWG’s internal numbering system, there were around 1,190,000 
phishing emails. When the data was pulled from APWG’s database and limited to dates between 
March 2016 and March 2018, the final phishing email count was around 626,000 phishing 
emails. There were phishing emails older than March 2016 contained within the database; 
however, phishes before this date were sparse and irregular. While the volume of phishing emails 
became steadier within this timeframe, the dataset contains roughly three months’ worth of 
missing phishing emails. Most of these dates occur in March, April and November of 2016 and 
March 2017.  
Phishing emails were parsed into a dataframe where each row represented a single 
phishing email. Columns retained information on the ID assigned by APWG, the date the 
phishing email was reported to APWG, the sender who reported the phishing email, the subject 
line of the phish, and the email content of the phish.  
4.1 Data Preprocessing 
Not all phishing emails submitted fit the scope of the desired data, resulting in the need to 
further trim the dataset. There is no restriction on what a user can submit to APWG so many 
emails were in foreign languages, missing structural portions of an email (ex. an email sent with 
only a subject line and no body) or merely just pictures. Thus, emails that were in a language 
other than English, missing both their subject line and body content or merely a string of random 
characters were excluded. Lastly, for emails that had identical content, the duplicates were 
eliminated, and the first instance of the email was retained. For those emails that contained blank 
content but had a value for their subject line, the subject line was copied into the body of the 
email. After these pruning operations, 114,161 emails remained. 
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Data fed into the LDA model contained only meaningful words, from which categories 
were created. Contractions were converted to their uncontracted form. Numbers, punctuations, 
stop words (words frequently used in language like ‘the’), website links and email addresses 
were removed. Even after the aforementioned items were removed, strings remained in the email 
that were not English words. Strings that contained two or less characters, six or more 
consonants in a row or four or more vowels in a row were removed.  
Compound words are a linguistic structure that retains a meaning distinct from the two 
words that comprise it. Humans can understand this distinction; however, machines will see the 
compound word and interpret it as two separate words (Bullard, 2015). To overcome that 
limitation, compound words were combined into one word. Bigrams, a sequence of two adjacent 
words in a string, helped to identify compound word candidates. Only those bigrams with a raw 
count greater than 3,000 were considered as candidates. From this list, bigrams that were 
identified as compound words or proper nouns, such as “united” and “states”, were combined 
into one word. 
Within the corpus, words take on different forms depending upon their grammatical 
usage. To normalize the data and reduce the number of tokens, the corpus was run through a 
Snowball Stemmer (Stahl et al., 2021). Other stemming options considered were the Porter 
Stemmer (NLTK Project, 2020) and the Lancaster Stemmer (Tomcavage, 2001). When using the 
most aggressive stemming algorithm, the Lancaster Stemmer, most of the words were 
unrecognizable. These tokens needed to be somewhat recognizable to humans since the quality 
of the formed topics would be judged by humans later in the analysis. The Snowball Stemmer is 
an updated version of the Porter Stemmer. The Snowball Stemmer was chosen because the 
words were not chopped to the extent that the word was indiscernible.  
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An abundance of gibberish character strings such as ‘iddyiv’ made working with this 
dataset challenging. An attempt to overcome this was to run the stemmed words through the 
Hunspell spell-checking engine (Gegzna et al., 2016). The Hunspell spell-checking engine 
identifies misspelled words and provides spelling suggestions. Misspelled words were removed 
from the dataset. Figure 2 provides an example of a phishing email before and after performing 
the aforementioned text cleaning operations.  
4.2 Discovering Phishing Topics 
 Before the phishing corpus can act as an input to LDA, it was transformed into a 
document-term matrix through a bag-of-words model. Losing the grammatical structure and 
word order of the documents, a bag-of-words model tokenizes each document into word-sized 
tokens, builds a vocabulary of terms contained within each corpus, and then provides the 
frequency for each term. When running the bag-of-words model, an effort was made to obtain a 
meaningful dataset that would aid in topic creation. A word had to appear in at least 50 
documents: this served to eliminate rare terms that would not aid in clustering. Words appearing 
Figure 2: Example of a raw phishing email (top) that has been cleaned (bottom) through the steps described above. 
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in at least 10% of the documents were also removed so that these frequently-used words did not 
dominate the analysis. Furthermore, after removing the top 10% of words, the vocabulary size 
was limited to the 7,000 most common words.  
LDA was used to discover the latent topics contained within the phishing email corpus. 
One input to be defined for an LDA model is the number of latent topics contained within the 
corpus. In terms of model performance, the optimal LDA model is the one that has the lowest 
perplexity, a measure of how well a model’s probability distribution predicts test data, since a 
low perplexity indicates that the current model generalizes well to new data. To find the optimal 
number of topics, the value for the number of topics was initially varied from 10 to 200 in step 
sizes of 10. Ninety was selected as the optimal number of topics based on the perplexity score 
and the topics produced by each LDA model. The above analysis was run again at a finer 
granularity with a step size of one over a smaller range and once again 90 was selected as the 
optimal number of topics.  
After selecting the optimal number of latent topics, the LDA model hyperparameters 
were fine-tuned. A grid search was conducted to find the optimal document topic prior and topic 
word prior, using loglikelihood scores to evaluate performance. The results of the grid search 
revealed 0.02 as the best value for both hyperparameters.  
There are two expected outputs for LDA – a distribution of words for each latent 
phishing topic identified and a distribution of latent phishing topics for each phishing email.  
Table 1 displays an example of one of the LDA outputs for a corpus of four emails and 
three topics. Each row in the table represents a single email and each column indicates the 
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probability that that particular topic belongs to that email so as to provide a distribution of latent 
topics for that email. 
Table 1: Example of a distribution of latent phishing topics for each phishing email in a corpus with four emails and 
three topics. Each cell indicates the probability that a topic belongs to an email.  
 Topic 1 Topic 2 Topic 3 
Email 1 0.0995 0.8691 0.0314 
Email 2 0.6676 0.1896 0.1428 
Email 3 0.7906 0.1726 0.0368 
Email 4 0.1403 0.3709 0.4888 
 The Euclidean distance, calculated on the distribution of latent topics for each phishing 
email, was used to measure the similarity between the latent topics. The Euclidean distance 
measures the distance between two points, say points x and y, in an n-dimensional Euclidean 
space (Wolfram, 2021). Let point x have Cartesian coordinates (x1, x2, x3, …, xn) and point y have 
Cartesian coordinates (y1, y2, y3, …, yn). The Euclidean distance between these two points is 
defined in Equation ( 1 ).  
𝑑(𝑥, 𝑦) =  √(𝑥1 − 𝑦1)2 + (𝑥2 − 𝑦2)2 + (𝑥3 − 𝑦3)2 + ⋯ + (𝑥𝑛 − 𝑦𝑛)2  
( 1 ) 
Using Table 1 as an example, topic similarity was measured by calculating the Euclidean 
distance between each pairwise combination of rows in the table. For Email 1 and Email 2, the 
Euclidean distance is  
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𝑑(𝐸𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑙 1, 𝐸𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑙 2) =
 √(0.0995 − 0.6676)2 + (0.8691 − 0.1896)2 + (0.0314 − 0.1428)2 = 0.8927 
This process was continued for all pairwise combinations, creating a topic similarity point 
estimate.  
As a raw output from the LDA model, the latent phishing topics are not readily defined; 
topics were named with human input based on the words associated with the topic.  
Running the LDA model addressed Hypothesis 1.  
𝐻0: 𝑃ℎ𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑠 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑏𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 
𝐻𝐴: 𝑃ℎ𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑠 𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑏𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 
To validate the quality of the topics produced by LDA, human input was sought. Two 
human evaluation tasks were used – word intrusion and topic intrusion. The premise for both 
tasks is the same: when a cohesive set is shown (whether the set be a group of words to form a 
topic or a set of topics to describe an email), it should be easy to distinguish the members from 
Figure 3: Example word intrusion tasks (left) and topic intrusion task (right). The intruder word is "shop”, and the intruder topic is 
"Food | Place | Great | Restaurant | Love | Friend | Order | Really" 
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an ‘intruder’ member that is not semantically cohesive. Word intrusion tasks measure the 
semantic cohesion of a topic and topic intrusion tasks measure how well the model associates a 
topic to a given document. Figure 3 provides an example of a word intrusion task on the left and 
a topic intrusion task on the right.  
The study recruited eight people, which fits the recommended size for a small focus 
group (Tynan and Drayton, 1988). Classifications determined through human input were 
compared to the LDA classifications. If the tasks indicate a degree of accordance between the 
human classifications and the LDA classifications based on the similarity metrics used for each 
task, then the null hypothesis will be rejected.  
For the word intrusion task, each subject was exposed to a set of six words and asked to 
identify the ‘intruder’ word. Five of the words have the highest probability from the selected 
topic. The intruder word was randomly selected from a pool of five most probable words from 
the remaining topics. Before it was chosen as the intruder word for the task, it was verified to 
have a low probability with the selected topic. Defining the intruder in this way reduced the 
chance of the word association to the other words in the set while guarding against the word 
chosen as the intruder due to rarity. These six words were shuffled before they were presented to 
the subject. Twenty topics were subjected to the word intrusion task – ten were hand-selected 
and ten were selected at random. The word intrusion task uses model precision, defined as the 
percentage of subjects that agree with the LDA-chosen intruder word, to measure human 
accordance with LDA’s classification.  
For the topic intrusion task, each subject received a snippet of the email and a set of four 
topics: the subject must identify the ‘intruder’ topic. The entire email was not shown to reduce 
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the response time for the subjects. Three of those topics had the highest probability of being 
assigned to selected document and the intruder topic was randomly chosen from the other low-
probability topics in the model. Each topic is represented by the eight words most strongly 
associated with the topic. This task included 12 topics – 10 were randomly chosen and 2 were 
hand-selected. The topic intrusion task uses Topic Log Odds (TLO) to measure human 
accordance with LDA’s classification. Using the posterior probability of the topic’s correct 
assignment to the phishing email corpus, TLO generates a value with an upper-bound of zero 
that is achieved when human and LDA judgement agree. It calculates this value through a log 
ratio of the posterior probability assigned to the true intruder to the posterior probability assigned 
to the subject’s selected intruder. Equation ( 2 ), defining the TLO measure, follows (Chang et 
al., 2009). 
 Let 𝜃𝑑
𝑚 denote model m’s point estimate of the posterior probability associated with 
document d. 𝑗𝑑,𝑠 
𝑚 denotes the intruder topic selected by subject s for document d on model m 
while 𝑗𝑑,∗  
𝑚 denotes the ground truth intruder topic. Here S refers to the number of subjects.  
𝑇𝐿𝑂𝑑









( 2 ) 
With the topic odds ratio, the higher the value, the more the human subjects agree with 
the LDA’s classification; with this calculation, the upper-bound of zero is achieved when the 
human subject selects the same topic as the topic chosen by the model.  
Page 35 of 69 
 
4.3 Temporal Pattern Analysis  
Under the LDA model, it is possible for a phishing email to have multiple topics. It was 
decided that the topic assigned to the email is the one with the highest probability: for this 
analysis, each email only has one topic. Once topics were assigned to emails, the data was turned 
into a time series by summing the number of emails appearing each day with a given topic, 
creating a time-series for each phishing topic. 
Once the topics were discovered and assigned, an initial analysis examined the 
distribution of topics over a calendar year to note when spikes in topics occur, the duration that 
these topics persisted, and any regularities in the popularity of topics. To aid in identifying the 
patterns, the graphs displayed a frequency count over the two-year time period for each topic.  
 This graphical analysis aided in answering Hypothesis 2a.  
𝐻0: 𝑁𝑜 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑏𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 
𝐻𝐴: 𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑏𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 
Here, patterns are defined to occur when correlation exists among the observations. If the time 
series consists of independent observations, then that topic has no life cycle pattern. This will be 
tested with the Box-Pierce test, which is a statistical test that indicates if the observations are 
white noise. These underlying patterns will be leveraged later in the analysis to create the 
predictive model.  
 Phishing topic frequencies were compared using the Longest Common Sequence (LCS) 
algorithm, an algorithm that aims to calculate the length of the longest common subsequence 
(LLCS) between the given sequences (Petzoldt, 2007). LCS uses the Qualitative Similarity Index 
Page 36 of 69 
 
(QSI) to assess similarity. QSI measures similarity by comparing LLCS to the length of the 
longest given sequence. Since LCS works with a string, or sequence of nominal variables, the 
frequencies were converted into “High”, “Medium”, and “Low” based on the frequency’s 
quartile after normalization. High corresponded to values greater than the third quartile; low 
corresponded to values lower than the median and medium represented values in between the 
median and the third quartile.  
 At this point in the research, measurements have been calculated to assess pairwise 
similarity between the phishing topics, as well as pairwise similarity between the frequency 
patterns of the phishing topics. With this information, the research explored whether similar 
topics share a similar life cycle. The Euclidean distances that measured topic similarity were 
plotted against the QSI scores that measured frequency pattern similarity to create a scatter plot. 
The Pearson correlation coefficient was used to judge correlation. This coefficient takes on a 
value between -1 and 1, with -1/1 indicating perfect negative/positive linear correlation and 0 
indicating lack of correlation.  
After performing the above similarity analyses, the frequency data was turned into 
intensity data. Conversion to an intensity signal highlighted the days that had more emails than 
usual. Intensity is defined in Equation ( 3 ).  
the number of emails of that topic recorded that day 
max number of emails of that topic ever seen in a day 
 
( 3 ) 
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The intensities were smoothed using a rolling mean with a window of five days. Upon 
visualizing, it was decided that analyzing the bursts of activity, rather than the entire intensity 
signal (Figure 4) could provide additional insights.  
After determining the existence of life cycle patterns and turning the time-series into 
intensities, a clustering algorithm was run to see if any phishing topics had similar life cycles. 
The k-means clustering method, where k indicates the number of clusters to create, is a popular 
clustering technique that was applied in this situation. It uses the Euclidean distance to determine 
the similarity between two entities. Here the entities are the full intensity signals for each 
phishing topic. Since the entire intensity signal is used, all signals have the same length of two 
years (the March 2016 to March 2018 timeframe). Clustering answers Hypothesis 2b, which is 
contingent upon rejecting the null hypothesis of Hypothesis 2a. 
𝐻0: 𝑂𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑠 







Figure 4: Bursts were selected from the entire intensity signal to represent an increased flurry of activity. The entire 
intensity is the black line in the figure, whereas the circled portions are bursts of activity. Each circled portion is a 
single burst of activity.  
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By rejecting this null hypothesis, dominant patterns among phishing topics can be identified and 
membership to these dominant patterns can be assigned for each phishing topic. Having the 
intensity signals map to more than one dominant pattern opens the possibility for an external 
event to drive the differences in intensity signals.  
4.4 Burst Analysis  
 To begin the burst analysis, bursts of activities were isolated and recorded into their own 
data frame. One phishing topic frequency could have more than one burst of activity; in these 
cases, the bursts were isolated and treated as independent occurrences. Information regarding 
phishing topic membership was retained. A burst of activity is defined as those intensities that 
return to its baseline after increasing, span at least five days, and has a spike that is at least twice 
 
Figure 5: Displays an example of identifying bursts of activity within the intensity time series for Topic 27. The 
black circles represent the time-series, and the pink line represents the identified burst in activity. 
as high as the other intensities. Figure 5 depicts an example of a burst of activity against the 
backdrop of its full intensity time-series. Since the duration of the bursts differ, all bursts were 
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centered and imputed with values of zero so that all bursts were the same length as the longest 
burst. An example of this process is depicted in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: Example of a dataframe with four bursts captured over a span of 20-days. Over the same 20-day 
timeframe, each captured burst happened at different points in time and for various durations. The figure on the left 
shows the original dataframe and the dataframe on the right shows the dataframe after all bursts have been 
centered and imputed with the value of zero.  
Just as cluster analysis was used on the entire frequency to find similarities, k-means was 
applied to the bursts to see if there were distinct groups of bursts. Each cluster found by k-means 
was characterized by the average of the cluster members; the cluster mean indicated the typical 
magnitude of the burst and the number of days the burst of activity stayed above its baseline.  
An area of interest was to see if similar phishing topics had similar burst patterns. It 
began with a study to see how topically similar the burst frequency patterns were before any 
predictions occurred to set expectations on prediction performance. It was expected that if the 
burst clusters were topically similar, then a supervised learning algorithm could correctly place 
Burst 1 Burst 2 Burst 3 Burst 4 Burst 1 Burst 2 Burst 3 Burst 4
Day 1 0.2 2.1 Day 1 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.0
Day 2 0.4 4.3 Day 2 0.0 0.0 4.3 0.0
Day 3 0.8 4.3 0.4 Day 3 0.0 0.0 4.3 0.0
Day 4 1.0 8.6 3.2 Day 4 0.0 0.2 8.6 0.0
Day 5 1.1 12.8 3.1 Day 5 0.0 0.4 12.8 0.2
Day 6 0.5 1.0 10.7 3.1 Day 6 0.5 0.8 10.7 0.4
Day 7 0.5 0.8 8.6 3.1 Day 7 0.5 1.0 8.6 3.2
Day 8 0.4 0.9 8.6 3.2 Day 8 0.4 1.1 8.6 3.1
Day 9 0.3 0.7 4.3 0.4 Day 9 0.3 1.0 4.3 3.1
Day 10 0.3 0.6 2.1 0.3 Day 10 0.3 0.8 2.1 3.1
Day 11 4.2 0.6 2.1 0.3 Day 11 4.2 0.9 2.1 3.2
Day 12 4.3 0.5 2.1 0.4 Day 12 4.3 0.7 2.1 0.4
Day 13 4.3 0.2 2.1 Day 13 4.3 0.6 2.1 0.3
Day 14 0.5 0.2 2.1 Day 14 0.5 0.6 2.1 0.3
Day 15 0.3 2.1 Day 15 0.3 0.5 2.1 0.4
Day 16 2.1 Day 16 0.0 0.2 2.1 0.2
Day 17 4.3 Day 17 0.0 0.2 4.3 0.0
Day 18 4.3 Day 18 0.0 0.0 4.3 0.0
Day 19 4.3 Day 19 0.0 0.0 4.3 0.0
Day 20 2.1 Day 20 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.0
Centered & Imputed
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that member back with its cluster. Cosine similarity judged how topically similar members of a 
burst pattern were to each other. After obtaining a baseline, a k-nearest neighbors (KNN) leave-
one-out cross validation was executed. KNN classifies a data point based on how its k closest 
neighbors as measured by Euclidean distance are classified. This enabled insight into whether a 
removed member from a burst pattern cluster would return to the same burst pattern cluster it 
belonged to in the k-means clustering results.  
4.5 Correlation Analysis & Predictive Model 
After studying phishing topic trends, the focus shifted to defining correlations between 
phishing topics and notable events. Notable events can either be an event that would make the 
headlines in the news, such as hurricanes greater than level 3 that have hit the US and caused 
more than $1 billion of damages or a predictable event such as the US presidential elections. 
Initial events analyzed are ones that happen consistently and reliably, such as the holiday season.  
Intervention analysis determined if the phishing topics were correlated with the event in 
question. It does this by capturing the mean level of the time series and noting how much the 
mean level has shifted after an intervention, or an external event. Websites used to create the 
time-series for the various interventions can be found in Table 3. These time-series contain 
zeroes and ones – ones to indicate the days that the intervention took place. The intervention 
model extends the traditional ARIMA model by including a transfer function (Montgomery, 
2008). There are two basic inputs from which to model the intervention event – step input and 
pulse input. From these two basic types, more patterns can be created. A step input models an 
intervention that has caused a permanent change to the mean level. Whereas a pulse input models 
an intervention that causes a temporary change to the mean level. Interventions for all topics 
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were modelled either using a pulse input or a decayed pulse input. In a decayed pulse input, an 
abrupt change in the mean level happens and then returns to the mean level. Interventions that 
focus on a single day were modelled as pulses; while interventions that are a season or cycle 
were modelled as decayed pulses.  
If the variables for the transfer function are not statistically significant, then the below 
null hypothesis will have failed to be rejected – the specific notable event has no influence on the 
phishing topic in question.  
𝐻0: 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 ℎ𝑎𝑠 𝑛𝑜 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑜𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 
𝐻𝐴: 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑎 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 
Once found, these time correlations formed the basis of a predictive model. Since the 
historical pattern that is contingent upon the occurrence of an event has been defined, it is 
possible to determine if a phishing email topic is more likely to occur within a certain timeframe 
using a supervised learning technique. The sample of the dataset will be split into training and 
test sets. A variety of supervised classifiers, such as support vector machine (SVM), logistic 
regression, and random forest, will be trained. Model performance will be evaluated using the F-
score, a relevance measure defined as the harmonic mean between precision and recall, and 
accuracy produced when evaluating performance on the test set. All the classifiers will be binary 
classifiers since the goal of the prediction model is to determine whether a particular phishing 
topic is more or less likely to occur on a certain day. More specifically, the classifiers will 
determine if a phishing topic is above its constant mean intensity level for that day. Here day 
refers to the number of days from a noteworthy event occurring. If any of the classifiers predict 
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better than naïve classifier (always predicting the majority class), then the null hypothesis will be 
rejected.  
5. Results and Discussion 
5.1 Findings for Hypothesis 1 
 
𝐻0: 𝑃ℎ𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑠 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑏𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 
𝐻𝐴: 𝑃ℎ𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑠 𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑏𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 
After adjusting the hyperparameters for the LDA model, the LDA model produced 90 topics 
from the phishing corpus. Figure 7 gives an example of the topics suggested by the model. 
Human input was sought for the validity of the topics suggested by the model. Table 2 displays 
the results from the Intrusion tasks.  
  
Figure 7: Example topics produced by the LDA model. LDA does not suggest topic names – that is 
left up to the human evaluator to decide. Possible topic names could be affordable fashion (left), job 
opportunity (center), mailing lists (right).  
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Table 2: Results from the Topic and Word Intrusion tasks 
Task Type Metric Set Value 
Word Intrusion Tasks Model Precision 
Average of All Topics 74% 
Hand-selected Topics 90% 
Randomly Selected Topics 59% 
Topic Intrusion Tasks 
Topic Log Odds 
(TLO) 
Average of All Topics -0.89 
Hand-selected Topics -0.15 
Randomly Selected Topics -1.04 
 
The average model precision for the 20 word intrusion tasks was 74%: on average, the correct 
intruder word is selected 74% of the time. Table 2 shows that the average model precision is 
higher for the hand-selected topics than it is for the randomly selected topics. A similar pattern 
emerges when looking at the results for topic log odds; for the hand-selected topics based on the 
TLO, humans agree with the model’s judgements more than in the instance with the randomly 
selected topics.  
 The LDA model was able to successfully find 90 different topics in the phishing email 
corpus. With an average model precision for the intrusion tasks of 74% and the average topic log 
odds for the topic intrusion tasks as -0.89, these topics are such that humans would be able to 
understand them. With this we can conclude that phishing topics can be detected; thus, rejecting 
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the null hypothesis of Hypothesis 1. Comparing the performance metrics between the randomly 
selected topics and hand-selected topics shows that there is a difference in quality of the topics 
produced by the LDA model: some topics are easier to grasp than others.  
5.2 Findings for Hypothesis 2A and 2B 
𝐻0: 𝑁𝑜 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑏𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 
𝐻𝐴: 𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑏𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 
 
𝐻0: 𝑂𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑠 
𝐻𝐴: 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡 
 
 With every topic converted into a time-series, all topics were run through a Box-Pierce 
test to validate the existence of life cycle patterns among the phishing topic frequencies. Of the 
90 topics, all but four of the topic frequencies rejected the null hypothesis, verifying that the 
time-series did not produce white noise. Thus, rejecting the null hypothesis of Hypothesis 2A.  
Calculating the QSI score enabled a point measure of similarity between the frequencies 
of the phishing topics. Using this point measure against the Euclidean distance of the LDA 
model output allowed for further insight into whether similar topics resulted in similar frequency 
patterns. Running the Pearson’s correlation test on all the data points, the correlation coefficient 
is -0.34, a weak negative correlation. This lines up with what was expected after viewing the plot 
of the Euclidean distances against the QSI scores (Figure 8). However, when further examining 
Figure 8A, a “tail” in the data emerges. This region appeared to have a stronger negative 
Hypothesis 2A 
Hypothesis 2B 
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correlation than what occurs when viewing all data points. The Pearson’s correlation coefficient 
within this region is -0.71.  
By repeatedly running the k-means algorithm on the smoothed intensities and capturing 
the Between Clusters Sum of Squares (BCSS) and Within Cluster Sum of Squares (WCSS), it 
was determined that the optimal k-means algorithm produces 20 clusters (Figure 10). 
  
 
Figure 9 provides an example of the smoothed intensities, smoothed using a rolling mean with a 
window of five days, for a few phishing topics. All of the phishing topic intensities have distinct 
periods of bursts of activity. Based on this observation, it could be possible that each individual 
burst pattern could be generalized to a set of burst patterns.  
 
Figure 8:  
 8A – leftmost figure - The initial Pearson’s correlation test used all data points. 
 8B – rightmost figure - Once plotted, an interesting "tail" emerged, and a second Pearson’s correlation test was run on just those data 
point. 
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 Figure 9: Displaying the smoothed intensities for a couple of phishing topics 
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Figure 10: Examining BCSS and WCSS for various values of k 
Box-Pierce tests were executed on all 90 phishing topics. Results showed that 95.6% of 
the phishing topics were correlated. Since it was determined that the topic life cycle patterns are 
not white noise, the research continued to define how many life cycle patterns exist. The k-
means algorithm’s optimal number of clusters was 20. With this result, the null hypothesis of 
Hypothesis 2B is rejected. At this point in the research, it has been shown that a frequency 
pattern can be made from a corpus of emails by breaking down the emails into thematic topics. 
Moreover, when broken down into frequency patterns, the phishing topics do not follow a single 
pattern. This enables speculation as to what causes these timing differences within the same 
phishing email corpus and still allows the work to proceed to see if extraneous variables can aid 
in the characterization of the lifestyle pattern.  
5.3 Burst Analysis Findings  
 Running the k-means algorithm on the identified bursts revealed 20 distinct clusters of 
burst patterns. Now that cluster groups were found, the next step was to characterize the burst 
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patterns by observing the average intensity. Figure 11 displays the average mean intensity for 
Figure 11: Characterizing clusters by displaying the mean intensity for the cluster (red line) 
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two randomly-selected clusters – Cluster 9 and Cluster 15. Cluster 9 members are characterized 
by an average max peak intensity of 1.5 and an average peak length of 59 days. Whereas Cluster 
15 reached an average max peak intensity of 2.5 and peaks for an average of 34 days.   
Calculating the pairwise cosine similarity of the distribution of words for each topic 
within the cluster gives insight to how similar two topics are. An average of the pairwise cosine 
similarity scores within a cluster characterized how topically similar the cluster is. The average 
cosine similarity cluster score ranged from 0.733 to 0.880, with a grand average of 0.826. 
Another set of 20 clusters was created. Instead of creating this set of clusters using k-means, 
members for the clusters were randomly selected. Cluster sizes match the cluster sizes from the 
prior k-means algorithm. For the randomly generated clusters, the average cosine similarity 
ranged from 0.608 to 0.904, with a grand average of 0.731. A one-sample t-test was run to 
determine if the k-means cosine similarity scores were more closely related than the randomly 
generated cosine similarity scores. All statistical tests conducted in this section used the SciPy 
package in Python. For this test, 0.731 was taken to be the population mean. The null hypothesis 
stated that there is no difference between the sample mean and 0.731. The alternative hypothesis 
stated that the sample mean is greater than 0.731. First, a Shapiro-Wilk test performed at a 95% 
confidence level was performed to determine if the k-means cosine similarity scores were 
normally distributed. The Shapiro-Wilk test produced a p-value of 0.889: the k-means cosine 
similarity scores are normally distributed. Next, an upper tail t-test performed at a 95% 
confidence level was performed and produced a p-value of 1.67x10-8. This result shows that the 
phishing topic clusters are more topically similar than if they were to have come from a random 
set of 20 clusters.  
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 After knowing the degree of topic similarity within a cluster, an analysis was done to see 
if clusters that are topically similar will have similar peak frequency patterns. The 20 burst 
pattern clusters that were found earlier were based on the frequencies of the burst patterns. Since 
it is already known that the clusters themselves can somewhat be based on phishing topic 
similarity, a KNN leave-one-out cross validation was performed. The results of this cross-
validation effort revealed a 7.2% accuracy. Due to the low accuracy score, it cannot be said that 
an email’s topic can be used to predict its burst pattern.  
 The burst analysis revealed that there are 20 different burst pattern clusters and members 
of each cluster have moderately similar topics. However, the findings here do not allow for the 
possibility to match an individual topic to a burst pattern cluster. The analysis was hoping to 
show, based on the characteristics of the burst pattern cluster, one could predict how long it takes 
for that burst of phishing activity to reach its max peak intensity and the duration of that peak. 
5.5 Findings for Hypothesis 3 
𝐻0: 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 ℎ𝑎𝑠 𝑛𝑜 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑜𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 
𝐻𝐴: 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑎 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 
 All topics found through the LDA model were analyzed and reviewed for possible 
influencing events. After the review, 10 topics were identified to have external events that could 
have possibly influenced the intensity of emails over time. The corresponding subjects and 
possible event are listed in Table 3. 
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Table 3: 10 LDA topics identified to have possible influencing events. Winter holiday season is defined to be mid-
November to mid-January. For the recruitment cycle, recruitments tend to occur January through May and again in 







1 Weight loss supplements New Year’s Day --- 
5 Stylish fashion Major shopping holidays Business News 
Daily, 2020 
17 Store purchases Winter holiday season Doyle, 2018 
47 FedEx delivery Winter holiday season Doyle, 2018 
49 Gift cards, Amazon & 
Walmart rewards survey 
Winter holiday season Doyle, 2018 
58 Package deliveries Winter holiday season Doyle, 2018 
59 Apply to a job Recruitment cycle Clark, 2018 
68 Taxes Tax season --- 
86 How to be healthy New Year’s Day --- 
89 Transfer money, Western 
Union 
Winter holiday season Doyle, 2018 
 
 Before doing the intervention analysis, all the topics were graphed alongside the 
intervention events. Figure 12 displays an example of what the topic’s intensity displayed as a 
time series, alongside its suspected intervention event. Essentially, the rest of the chosen topics 
displayed a similar trend in which, based on visual inspection alone, the chosen intervention 
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event did not appear to be correlated to the topic. Based on that observation, the intervention 
analysis was skipped for some topics.  
 
Figure 12: Example of a topic's intensity plotted with its possible intervention event. This is the intensity for emails 
with weight loss supplements as their topic (Topic 1). The possible intervention event was chosen to be New Year’s 
Day.  
 When examining the significance of the intervention event on the topic intensity, the 
significance of the intervention coefficient is analyzed. Figure 13 displays an example of the 
results of the Z-test for coefficients. For Topic 1, there are six coefficients associated with the 
model. The first coefficient indicates whether the error terms lagged by one day is significant; 
whereas the next four terms (ones that begin with “sar”) indicate whether Topic 1’s intensity 
lagged by one day, two days, etc. are significant. For the purposes of the intervention analysis, 
the last coefficient (T1-MA0) is the coefficient of interest because this coefficient belongs to the 
intervention event. As seen in Figure 13, T1-MA0 is not significant. Table 4 shows the 
significance test for coefficient results for the 10 chosen LDA topics. 
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Figure 13: Topic 1's Z-test for coefficients 
  
Page 54 of 69 
 
 








1 Weight loss supplements New Year’s Day Not Significant 
5 Stylish fashion Major shopping holidays Not Significant 
17 Store purchases Winter holiday season Not Significant 
47 FedEx delivery Winter holiday season Not Significant 
49 Gift cards, Amazon & 
Walmart rewards survey 
Winter holiday season Not Significant 
58 Package deliveries Winter holiday season Not Significant 
59 Apply to a job Recruitment cycle Not Significant 
68 Taxes Tax season Not Significant 
86 How to be healthy New Year’s Day Not Significant 
89 Transfer money, Western 
Union 
Winter holiday season Not Significant 
 
Intervention analysis was used to see if external events had a possible influence on the 
intensity of the topic it was theorized to predict. Examining the z-test for coefficients of the 
intervention variables revealed the intervention variables to be not significant for each of the 
topics tested. The next step in the analysis would have been to test various predictive classifiers 
to see how likely a phishing topic would occur in the future based on external factors: since the 
intervention analysis found no correlations between external factors and the phishing topic 
intensity, the analysis ended here, and no predictive classifiers were pursued. 
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6. Conclusion 
 Were temporal trends coupled with external events able to be leveraged to predict the 
likelihood of a phishing attack? In short, with this dataset, that is not the case. While no 
predictive classifiers were built to determine if a certain phishing topic would occur more likely 
than the baseline activity in the presence of an external, influential event, the research confirmed 
other pertinent hypotheses. 
 This work started with around 1.2 million phishing emails and was predicated on the 
assumption that 1.2 million phishing emails could be grouped into a manageable number of 
latent topics. Not only could these latent topics be discovered but also understood and interpreted 
by a human. A task too daunting to be done manually, LDA was used to whittle down the 
phishing email into 90 distinct phishing topics. Word and topic intrusion tasks verified that 
people could understand how LDA derived these topics.  
 To study temporal trends, it was necessary to convert the data into a time-series. The 
time-series for each phishing topic was a frequency count of emails per day. Before any temporal 
trends could be leveraged, the existence of correlation in the data needed to be verified. The Box-
Pierce tests confirmed that 95.6% of the phishing topics were not independently distributed. 
Knowing that a majority of phishing frequencies were not white noise, the research continued to 
determine if all of the phishing frequencies conformed to one pattern or if there were dominant 
phishing frequencies. If there are distinct groups of phishing frequencies, this would fuel the 
possibility that there are influencing factors that could account for the difference in the individual 
phishing frequencies. Performing a k-means clustering algorithm uncovered 20 dominant 
phishing frequencies. This provided enough validation to continue to see if a predictive classifier 
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could be made. The phishing frequencies were turned into phishing intensities to highlight the 
days in which more than the expected amount of phishes relating to a particular topic happened.  
When conducting a visual analysis of the phishing intensities, some intensities had 
pronounced periods of increased activity, or a burst of activity. These bursts of activities became 
of interest. If there was a phishing topic on say, puppies for sale, that suddenly experienced a 
burst of activity, then perhaps, because it was known that a burst in activity in cats for sale 
peaked for a period of five days, one could expect that the puppies for sale burst in activity 
would last for around five days. The burst analysis set out to find evidence supporting a 
relationship between burst patterns and the phishing topics of the burst patterns. While a k-means 
algorithm found 20 dominant burst patterns, the results from the KNN algorithm showed that just 
because burst patterns can be clustered together based on intensity, it cannot be assumed that 
topic cohesion of the clusters can be a predictive tool.   
Before delving into predictive classifier development, the influencing, external events for 
a particular phishing topic had to be identified. A manual search through the 90 phishing topics 
found ten phishing topics that could have easily identifiable, influencing events. An intervention 
analysis revealed that, for this specific phishing email dataset, external events do not influence 
the occurrence of a particular phishing email topic. Thus, the search for predictive classifiers 
ended here.  
 While certainly not all similar topics correlate to having similar frequency patterns, 
Figure 8 showed the potential for a few similar topics that result in similar frequency patterns. 
This avenue was not explored during this work, but that result could point to the possibility of 
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having one topic frequency predict the outcome of another, rather than relying on external 
variables.  
 As mentioned earlier, all phishing emails were ones reported by individuals in the APWG 
community as being suspected phishing attempts. The database accessed and used were all 
malicious and suspicious emails but not all emails were phishing. Many had virus attachments 
and little else in the body of the email. 72% of the emails were pictures and resulted in a string of 
gibberish characters. These were all eliminated. This reduced the size of the original dataset to 
roughly 197,000 emails. Additionally, due to website maintenance and overhauls, the database 
shut down for periods of time, resulting in blocks of time without any emails. A timeframe was 
selected that had the most continuous dates of emails. This led to a further reduction in the 
sample set. Working with a smaller data set over a shorter period of time than anticipated could 
explain why discernable patterns were not found. Also, a smaller dataset could have resulted in 
topics that were too specific.  
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7. Appendix 
7.1 Listing of the 90 Topics Produced by the LDA Model  
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7.2 Coding Software & Packages Used in Methodology  
Language Usage Package – Version  
Python 3.6.3 Text Cleaning Operations hunspell – 0.5.0 
  string – {base} 
  nltk – 3.2.4 
 Data Manipulations pandas – 0.20.3  
  numpy – 1.13.3 
  re - 2.2.1 
  random – {base} 
  os – {base} 
  matplotlib – 2.1.0 
 LDA Model & Cross Validation mglearn – 0.1.6 
  sklearn – 0.19.1 
R 3.4.2 Time Series Analysis & k-means Algorithm stats – 3.4.2 
  zoo – 1.8.2 
 LCS Algorithm qualV – 0.3.3 
 Intervention Analysis lmtest – 0.9.36 
  TSA – 1.1 
  fma – 2.3 
  forecast – 8.4 
  Metrics – 0.1.4 
  pracma – 2.1.8 
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